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This paper studies slot allocation at congested airports in
Europe. First, I discuss the inefficiencies of  the current regulation,
introduced as part of the liberalisation process of the air transport
market. Then, I consider three marked based methods which are
suitable to achieve a more efficient allocation of slots to airlines:
congestion pricing, auctions and secondary trading. These methods
are examined in terms of their ability to improve efficiency and in
terms of their implications on the distribution of slots’ scarcity
rents. Special attention is drawn to complementarities between
slots. Finally, I propose to auction slots periodically, allowing
secondary trading well before the first auction takes place. By selling
slots before the first auction incumbents can be partially
compensated for the subsequent withdrawal of their slots. [JEL
Classification: D45; D61; L93; R41] 
1. - Introduction
Ever since the beginnings of commercial flight, the right to
take off and land (i.e. a slot) was allocated on a first-come first-
served basis with little or no coordination between carriers.
However, later in the sixties, long queues of airplanes waiting to
take off and land became common at major international airports
at peak times.
Therefore in 1968, in order to avoid wasteful delays, the
81
* <d.condorelli@ucl.ac.uk>, Department of Economics. The Author would like
to thank the editor of the journal Rivista di Politica Economica and an anonymous
referee for helpful comments.
Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) passed a rule that limited the
number of slots at four major airports in the United States (La
Guardia, Washington National, J.F. Kennedy and O’Hare Internat-
ional).
Efficient and non discriminatory rationing of available slots was
not an issue at that time, and take-off and landing schedules were
easily finalized through unanimous agreement from all involved
carriers. The system worked well for a number of years but
collapsed in the mid-eighties, soon after market deregulation
produced an increase in the number of operating airlines. It was
then evident that slot allocation required explicit regulation. In fact,
the FAA introduced new rules in 1985, assigning slots to airlines on
the basis of historical precedence and allowing secondary trading. 
In Europe, slot allocation has been regulated since 1993, as
part of the process of deregulation and liberalisation of the
European air transport market. The system works as follows. In
each Member State an independent authority (the coordinator)
realizes the preliminary allocation of the available slots at each
airport according to two main principles.
Grandfathering (historical precedence) with “use it or lose it”:
an airline that in a given season has effectively operated for at
least the 80% of a series of slots has the right, upon request, to
obtain the same series in the subsequent season.
Slot pool and new entrants: all slots that become available (due
to the introduction of more efficient flight control technologies,
due to the “use it or lose it” rule or because they are voluntarily
returned to the coordinator) form the slot pool and are
preferentially allocated to new entrants.1
Subsequently, representatives from all airlines, airports
managers and coordinators meet in a worldwide conference
organised by the International Air Transport Association (IATA).
During the conference allocations are finalized through bilateral
and multilateral exchanges of slots.
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1 A new entrant is either an airline that would have less than five slots in the
airport, if his demand for slots was met; or an airline which requests slots in order
to operate a direct connection between two European airports, if not yet operated
by at least two other companies.
The main difference with United States is that monetary
exchanges are not permitted in Europe. Notwithstanding
European regulations, in 1999 the High Court of the United
Kingdom authorized some transactions of slots involving
monetary compensations and opened the way to a grey market
now operating at UK airports.2
Both in the United States and in Europe, slots are allocated
for free to airlines, which pay an airport charge only in case of
effective usage of the slot. Airport charges are regulated in order
to limit the monopoly power of airport operators and are set to
provide a fair return on the invested capital. Thus, by their own
nature, airport charges do not serve the purpose of clearing the
market for runaway capacity.
The current grandfathering system has two important
virtues: it reduces transaction costs and allows carriers to plan
long term operations. However it suffers from a fatal drawback:
it does not guarantee allocative efficiency. This means that slots
will not tend to flow in the hands of those who value them the
most or, in other words, of those airlines with the lowest costs.
In fact, grandfathering can not ensure that slots are assigned to
airlines that are willing to pay the highest price for them,
therefore allowing incumbents to squeeze out from the market
efficient entrants. Moreover, the prohibition of monetary trading
in Europe jeopardizes the hope that an efficient outcome will
result from free trading, in the spirit of the so called Coase
theorem.
The problem at stake is relevant. According to NERA (2004),
a report prepared for the European Commission, about 20
European Airport appear congested during peak times (see page
I of the report). NERA’s report suggests that, by allocating slot
competitively, passenger traffic at congested airports in Europe
would increase by about 5% (see page VII of the report).
The following table reports data from Airports Council
International (ACI) Europe (2004) and illustrates the situation at
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13 major European airports in the 2002 summer season (going
from April to October). 
Starting with an explanation of how the current system
generates inefficiencies (section 2), this paper is dedicated to
discuss some problems that arise in the effort of allocating slots
more efficiently by using market mechanisms. The attention is
focused on three market methods: increasing airport charges,
auction of slots to airlines and free secondary trading with
grandfathering. Their implications in terms of efficiency (section
3) and distribution of the slots’ scarcity rents (section 4) are
discussed thoroughly. Attention is focused on two main trade-offs
which are faced by policymakers.
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TABLE 1
Airport Passengers Capacity Slot allocated Slots Realized
(‘000) per hour at IATA initially operations
conference requested
(100%)
Copenhagen 9,068 83 184,763 103.7% 93.8%
Dublin 7,346 44 115,256 100.3% 88.7%
Dusseldorf 7,300 38 129,468 107.3% 84.6%
Frankfurt 23,830 80 284,949 106.8% 95.6%
London Gatwick 14,760 46 177,211 134.3% 86.2%
London Heathrow 31,506 87 282,256 121.0% 97.3%
London Stansted 8,022 42 121,051 103.7% 86.2%
Madrid Barajas 17,024 78 253,875 108.5% 85.6%
Milan Linate 3,857 18 57,700 149.9% 85.3%
Milan Malpensa 7,701 70 164,937 104.7% 78.6%
Paris CdG 23,347 97 361,552 113.9% 82.4%
Schipol 20,366 106 275,000 106.6% 88.6%
Stockholm A. 8,228 76 172,900 108.3% 82.4%
Note: column 2 reports the total number of passengers served. Column 3 reports
the capacity available at the ariports in terms of slots per hour. Column 4
reports the number of slots allocated at the IATA conference, which is a
measure of the total available capacity at the airport. Column 5 reports the
number of initially requested slots, as a percentage of the available slots. This
column offers a measure of congestion at the airport. Column 6 reports the
number of slots operated at the end of the season, as a percentage of the slot
allocated at IATA conferences. This last column gives a measure of slots which
are allocated but not used or slots which are returned but whose re-allocation
has not been possible.
Efficiency vs Implementability: no practical mechanism exists
that clears the market and allocates efficiently, because slots exhibit
complementarities even within the same airport. The problem is
that a series of Walrasian time specific prices for slots may not exist
with complementarities. Thus, the first welfare theorem fails: with
linear prices market clearing does not imply allocative efficiency.
With complementarities, efficiency requires that slots should be
priced in bundles or even non-anonymously. However, large efficient
combinatorial auctions are impractical in many respects.
Incumbents vs New entrants: the introduction of a market
mechanism induces a trade-off between the interests of incumbents
and those of other parties, especially new entrants. Because
property rights for slots are not defined, it is not clear who should
appropriate the scarcity rents generated by the introduction of a
market for slots. In fact, either slots are initially allocated to those
airlines which hold them today in virtue of grandfathering, thus
granting them huge windfall gains; or they are subtracted to
incumbents and reallocated competitively, putting established
airlines at risk.
In section 5, I conclude the paper by proposing a mechanism
which tries to find a satisfactory compromise to the above
mentioned trade-offs: (i) slots should be periodically reallocated
through a combinatorial auction, simultaneously in the major
congested European airports, and (ii) monetary trading should be
allowed; (iii) before the first auction takes place a certain lapse
of time should pass to allow incumbents to rationalize their
networks, selling slots and monetizing part of the efficiency gains;
(iv) revenues could be used to offset existing airport charges and
develop new airport capacity.
The literature on the subject is not large. Starting in the sixties
scholars have argued for the introduction of market systems for
slot allocation. Levine (1969) proposed peak-load pricing to reduce
waiting times for take off and landing induced by the queuing
system. Grether, Isaac and Plott (1979) and (1981), studied the
simple unanimity system and contributed to shape the 1985
reform in the United States. These authors were also the first to
advocate the use of auctions.
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The first to take on the challenge of designing an auction for
slot allocation were Rassenti, Bulfin and Smith (1982). They
propose a combinatorial auction for paired take off and landing
slots. More recently, Ball Donohoue and Hoffman (2006), advocate
the use of auctions and express concerns for both equity and
efficiency of the resulting allocation. Among others, Colombo (2001)
proposes to run yearly auctions where only a fraction of all slots is
put up for sale. Jones, Marks and Viehoff (1993) informally identify
the problem with demand externalities (i.e. complementarities) and
provide, based on these, an interesting argument against the use of
auctions. Finally, several technical reports have been written on the
issue of slot allocation. Three of them appear more closely related
to my work: DotEcon (2001) study the feasibility of auctions, NERA
(2004) contains a general discussion on market mechanisms, and
Mott MacDonald (2006) analyses secondary trading.
2. - The Case for Efficiency
Pareto efficiency is the weakest (and so the most compelling)
welfare criterion adopted by economists to rank different
outcomes. An allocation (in our case: of slots to airlines) is Pareto
efficient if no other allocation exists that could make someone
better off without making anyone worse off. Therefore,
inefficiencies represent a net waste to society. In a world in which
monetary compensations are possible and where there are no
income effects (i.e. where preferences are such that money enters
additively in the utility function of agents), an allocation is efficient
if and only if it maximizes the total value generated in the economy. 
If we further assume that carriers’ willingness to pay for a
slot reflects the net increase in welfare that they are able to
generate by using the slot, efficiency requires that slots go to
airlines who are prepared to pay the highest price for them.3
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3 We are assuming that carriers’ willingness to pay for slots is aligned to social
welfare. However, there are many reasons why this may not be the case. Most
notably, some carriers may be willing to pay a lot for slots which guarantee market
power in the downstream market for air transport (see BORENSTEIN S., 1988).
To illustrate this point, suppose that two airlines First and
Second hold heterogeneous valuations for three slots A, B and C
as summarized in Table 2.4
The value of a set of slots is the sum of values that they attribute
to each slot (e.g. vF (AB) = a + b). When d > 0 Second values A and B
more than First does, while it values C less. Then an efficient
allocation will assign A and B to Second and C to First realizing a
maximum total value equal to vS (A,B) + vF (C) = a + b + c + 2d.
5
The present European regulatory system generates substantial
inefficiencies. On the one hand, grandfathering can not ensure that
airlines holding slots are those which value them the most. On the
other, since monetary trading is not permitted, there are no incentives
for a company to pass slots to more efficient competitors. Continuing
with the example in Table 2 (with d > 0), assume that First holds slots
A and C, while Second holds slot B. With the current regulation an
efficient allocation could not be achieved as First will not pass A for
free to Second. On the contrary, if monetary exchanges were allowed,
First could sell A to Second for a price vF (A) = a < PA < a + d = vS (A)
and both airlines would be better off.
3. - The Efficiency Toolbox
This section discusses three market based systems in their
ability to increase allocative efficiency. In particular, slots can be
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TABLE 2
VALUES
A B C
First a b c
Second a+d b+d c-d
Note: a,b,c,d ≥ 0, c>d.
4 It is not relevant whether slots belong to the same airport, to the same time
period of time, etc.
5 If d=0 then any allocation that assigned the three slots would be efficient as
the maximum value in each case is equal to a+b+c.
more efficiently allocated from the beginning, either by (i)
increasing airport charges up to market clearing prices; or by (ii)
selling slots through an auction. Moreover, efficiency can be
increased by (iii) allowing monetary trading of slots.
3.1. Increasing Airport Charges
Increasing airport charges at peak times, while reducing those
in periods of low demand, would certainly help toward allocating
slots more efficiently.6 Ideally, competitive prices should work as
suggested by the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics:
clearing the market and allocating efficiently. 
To fix ideas, suppose that at first there is only one slot for
sale which has no value unless it is allocated to someone, then a
competitive equilibrium would be a price such that only one bidder
would find it profitable to buy the slot (i.e. the airline with the
highest value for that slot).
When objects are heterogeneous (i.e. bidders may have
demand for more than one object), the situation is more complex.
However, the notion of competitive prices can still be extended.
Roughly speaking, the idea is to find a set of prices such that
there is no excess demand for any of the objects, and for which
all objects are allocated.
When we try to apply this idea to slots, a problem occurs. In
fact, competitive equilibrium prices may fail to exist in environments
where it is very likely that the same slots be complements for some
airlines, and substitutes for others. Unfortunately, if slots are not
substitutes for all airlines, no system of individual prices will be able
to clear the market and, at the same time, achieve an efficient
allocation, according to the first welfare theorem (see, for example,
Gul and Stacchetti, 1999 and Milgrom, 2000).7
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6 To my knowledge, at present only Heathrow and Gatwick apply higher
charges during peak times in Europe. This provision, however, does not fully
eliminate excess demand (see Table 1).
7 We say that slots are substitutes if increasing the price of some slots will
never reduce demand on slots whose prices do not increase.
To see the point, consider the following example. Two slots
in two close periods of time are now available at a single
airport. First and Second evaluate slots according to the
following Table 3.
Then, slots are complements for First (e.g. because First  hopes
to profit from a time sensitive demand sector and needs to set up
more than one flight within a very short period of time) and
substitutes for Second (e.g. because Second only needs to schedule
one flight in that period). Efficiency requires that both slots go to
First. However no set of prices {PA, PB} exists that allocate slots
efficiently. In fact, we must have PA + PB ≤ 2c + d = vF (A, B),
otherwise First would not buy the two slots. However this implies
that either PA < c + 0.6d = vS (A) or PB ≤ c + 0.6d = vS (B) which
means that Second will still demand one of the two slots and the
market will not clear.8
Competitive equilibrium prices exist when slots are substitutes
for all airlines. However, even if a competitive equilibrium exists
another fatal problem arises. It seems quite difficult that airport
operators or regulators will have the necessary information in each
season to compute market clearing prices. Congestion pricing is
useful when values are known in advance while the quantity
available is unknown, as the latter is to be determined by market
forces. In our case, however, the total available quantity of slots
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8 Note that the two prices PA = c + 0.6d and PB = c would not clear the market
because both First and Second will demand B. There are prices that clear excess
demand but that do not form a competitive equilibrium because, contrary to the
interest of the seller, some slot is left unsold; for example, if PA = c + 0.6d and PB
= c + ε only slot A would be demanded by Second while slot B will not be sold.
TABLE 3
VALUES
A B AB
First c c 2c+d
Second c+0.6d c+0.6d c+0.6d
Note: c, d > 0.
is perfectly known in advance while prices (more precisely, the
highest prices that airlines would be willing to pay for them) are
not. This brings us to auctions.
3.2. Auctions
Auctions are mechanisms where the quantity for sale is known
in advance and equilibrium prices are revealed from the rational
and self interested interaction between market participants who
privately hold the necessary information to compute them.
When equilibrium prices exist, auctions can be viewed as
a practical implementation of the fictitious Walrasian
auctioneer. In fact, if valuations for slots were substitutes for
all airlines a simple simultaneous ascending auction would end
up allocating the slots efficiently. In the simplest ascending
auction format all slots would be put for sale simultaneously.
Airlines would place irrevocable bids and prices would rise
until the market clears.
A more subtle version of the simultaneous ascending format
is the clock auction. In this case the auctioneer starts by
announcing reservation prices for each slot. Bidders respond with
the quantities desired at those prices. Then prices are increased
for items in excess demand, while other prices remain unchanged.
The process is repeated until there is no excess demand for any
of the items.
However, as I mentioned in the previous section, it is very
likely that slots will be complements, at least for some airlines.
When this is the case the simultaneous ascending auction, which
maintains linear pricing of slots through the process (i.e. the price
of a bundle of slots is equal to the sum of the individual slot
prices), will not work properly. In particular, the auctioneer will
face a trade off between the exposure problem (the risk for bidders
of paying too much for a slot that is useless without the
complement slot) and the possibility of not selling some slots at
the end of the auction.
Consider again the clock auction. Under complementarities,
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it may happen that at some point demand equals supply for
one slot but it exceeds supply for a complementary slot. Then
the auctioneer would keep the price of the first slot constant,
while increasing the price of the complementary one. However
demand for the first slot may decrease as a result of the
increase in price of the complement. Now two cases are
conceivable: either the auctioneer restricts the changes that a
bidder is allowed to make in its demand from round to round,
(e.g. by asking that demand for a slot cannot be reduced unless
the price of the slot increases), thereby creating the exposure
problem; or the auctioneer poses fewer restrictions on demand
changes and accepts that some slot may not be sold at the end
of the auction.9
This problem can be better illustrated looking at the following
example in Table 4.
In a clock auction, First and Second will continue to demand
both A and B until PA = PB = x. At this point the auctioneer will
rise both prices by a small amount ε, setting PA = PB = x + ε.
Now, because PA = PB > 2x = vS (A,B), Second will demand only one
of the two slots, say A, while First will still demand both of them.
The auctioneer will rise again the price of A to PA = x + 2 ε, while
keeping the price of B unchanged. However, while First will
continue to demand both slots, Second will now switch his
demand from A to the cheaper B. Afterwards, the auctioneer
will increase the price of B only. This process will continue until
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again but then the auction would cycle and possibly never end.
TABLE 4
VALUES
A B AB
First x x 2x+d
Second x+0.6d x+0.6d 2x
x,d > 0.
PA = PB = 2x + d + ε < vF (A,B). Here there are two possibilities:
either (i) First is allowed to withdraw from both items at once
(even if the price of only one of them increased in the last stage)
and thus one slot will be left unsold or (ii) First cannot revise
his schedule for the slot whose price did not increase in the last
round and the auction ends allocating one slot to each bidder,
with First paying more than his value for the slot.10
Notwithstanding these problems, the ascending format has
already performed well in a variety of contexts such as the sale
of 3G mobile phones spectrum or electricity procurement. As a
matter of fact, the clock ascending auction has been used to run
a mock auction for slots at New York’s La Guardia airport, where
the Federal Aviation Administration is evaluating a market based
approach to slot allocation.
From a theoretical perspective, though, abandoning linear
pricing is a necessary condition to achieve an efficient allocation
of complement objects from the start. The case is stronger for slots,
because the impact of the exposure problem on efficiency may be
substantial while the possibility of underselling is a rather serious
problem with perishable items (slots which are not allocated at the
auction cannot be reallocated in subsequent auctions).
In theory, the ideal solution is offered by the Vickrey auction.
Named after the seminal contribution of Vickrey (1961), this design
is able to achieve in equilibrium the efficient allocation of a set of
goods even in the presence of complementarities and regardless of
the information held by each bidder about competitors (i.e. bidders
do not need to form expectations about other bidders’ values). In
the Vickrey auction each bidder submits an entire list of valuations,
one for each possible bundle of items. Then the auctioneer selects
the efficient allocation on the basis of the reported values and asks
all bidders to pay the opportunity cost of their participation (i.e.
each bidder pays the difference between the value of the efficient
allocation that would have been selected if he reported a value
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10 Observe that, in anticipation of this possibility, First, who does not know
the values of Second, will bid less aggressively from the start and, again, efficiency
will not be attained.
equal to zero for all bundles and the value that his opponents
obtain in the efficient allocation selected by the auctioneer by
considering all reports).11 To fix ideas consider the example in Table
4 and assume that 0.6d < x. Under the Vickrey scheme both First
and Second would bid truthfully and First would get both A and
B (i.e. the efficient allocation is obtained) and pay vS (AB) – vS (∅)
= 2x. In fact, if First reported zero for the three bundles both A
and B would go to Second, while Second obtains no benefit in the
efficient allocation with true reports. Now, suppose that Second
tried to obtain one object by misreporting. He would have to report
a value of x + d for one of the two objects in order to switch the
efficient allocation from “both A and B to First” to “A to First and
B to Second”. However he would lose money, as he would pay a
sum which is greater than his value for B: vF (AB) – vF (A) = x + d
> x + 0.6d = vS (B).
While the Vickrey auction is attractive in theory, it suffers from
a number of defects that hinder its successful application. The
main issue, in my view, is that in order to submit a whole set of
valuations for n slots, all airlines would need to evaluate 2n –1
possible combinations of slots, but this number gets astronomical
as n grows large.12
A vastly growing literature in economics, management and
computer sciences is dedicated to devise a more practical auction
format that would solve some of the Vickrey auction faults, while
partially keeping its benefits (i.e. achieving efficiency and extreme
strategic simplicity). Two formats are likely to attract considerable
interest in the near future: the first-price package auction and the
clock-proxy auction.
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11 When there is only one object for sale this correspond to the second-price
auction, as the opportunity cost is now the value of the object to the losing bidder.
12 Furthermore, bidders are forced to reveal a great deal of confidential
information about slot valuations which they may not like to declare (see ROTHKOPF
M. - TEISBERG T. - KAHN E., 1990). Moreover, other problems arise in the presence of
complementarities (for details see AUSUBEL L.M. - MILGROM P., 2006): the mechanism
may select an allocation which is not in the core, thus creating incentives to
renegotiate ex-post; apart from being non linear, prices may be non anonymous (i.e.
two bidders that submitted the same bid on a particular time slot may end up paying
very different amounts for the same slot); and bidders can profit by shill bidding
(creating fictitious companies to participate in the auction) or collusive behaviour.
In the first-price package auction bidders submit bids for
package of slots (for example, “I bid x to buy slot A and slot B, but
I won’t pay anything unless I get both”) and the auctioneer selects
the feasible combination of bids which achieves the maximum
value. Then every winner pays his own bid. With complete
information this auction also has an efficient Nash equilibrium.13
Not by chance, the granddad of combinatorial auction design is an
early proposal of Rassenti, Bulfin and Smith (1982) for a sealed-
bid first-price package auction of paired take off and landing slots. 
The clock-proxy auction, recently developed by Ausubel,
Cramton and Milgrom (2006), mixes the clock ascending
auction with package bidding. This format works as well as the
Vickrey auction when goods are substitutes (it allocates
efficiently and has an incomplete information equilibrium in
dominant strategies) while it alleviates some problems of the
Vickrey format when goods are complements (see footnote 12).
The auction develops in two phases. In the first clock phase
the auction works as a standard simultaneous-ascending clock
auction with bidders having the possibility of revising their
schedule. The proxy phase, which is essentially an ascending
package auction, serves to correct the possibility that the
outcome is inefficient or that some slots are left unsold. The
starting prices are those obtained in the clock auctions. Then,
bidders report their values only for packages of interest to an
automated proxy. Finally, the proxies play a simulated
ascending package auction. In each round the proxy submits a
bid for a package that maximizes the profit for the airline,
while the auctioneer selects the provisional final allocation by
maximizing revenue and announces the prices. Then proxies
place another bid but they cannot reduce the amount bid on
packages for which they have already bid. The auctioneer
selects another provisional allocation and the process continues
until no new bid is submitted by the proxies. Under complete
information this proxy phase has an efficient Nash equilibrium
as the first-price sealed bid package auction.
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13 See BERNHEIM D.B. - WHINSTON M. (1986) for the equilibrium analysis of the
auction.
3.3 Secondary Trading
In two seminal papers, Coase (1959, 1960) convincingly
argued that in a zero-transaction cost world (where information
is complete, trading is costless and capital markets are perfect)
the initial distribution of property rights has no effect on their
final allocation, as laissez-faire will always yields efficient
outcomes. The argument goes as follows: regardless of the
initial allocation, the ultimate allocation must be efficient;
otherwise someone could propose to implement a different
Pareto improving outcome that would be accepted by everyone. 
One might be tempted to conclude that it does not really
matter how slots are initially distributed since, if monetary
exchanges are permitted, efficiency will be attained in any case.
In fact, airlines will sell slots that generate low net revenues to
airlines wanting to operate services with higher net revenue.
However, although the logic behind the argument is certainly
valid, the violation of some of its assumptions mitigates the
strength of the conclusion.
In particular, it is well known that asymmetric information
might prevent the occurrence of efficient exchanges that would
otherwise take place. Under the same assumptions on
preferences postulated in this paper, Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) showed that, when information is private, there is no
bargaining protocol that guarantees that trade will take place
when it is efficient (unless it is known in advance that trading
will be Pareto improving). In particular, assume that First holds
slot A and that vF (A) = x ≤ 1, while vS (A) = y ≤ 1. Furthermore,
assume that First and Second do not know each other’s value
for A but both assess it as a random variable somehow
distributed in the interval [0,1]. Assume that all this is
commonly known. A bargaining protocol is any game, possibly
dynamic, played by First and Second whose outcome prescribes
who gets the object and who pays what to whom. The Myerson
and Sattherwaite theorem states that there exists no bargaining
protocol that works for every x and y, which is efficient (i.e.
assigns the object to Second if y > x and leaves it to First
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otherwise) and it is acceptable by both (i.e. if the object change
hands, Second does not pay more than y and First does not get
less than x).
The same argument led the Federal Communication
Commission staff to prefer auctions over lotteries in the allocation
of spectrum frequencies. When those advocating lotteries were
suggesting that the sole inclusion of the right to resale spectrum
was sufficient to achieve efficiency, economists advocating
auctions pointed out that when asymmetric information exists
auctions can efficiently allocate while there is no guarantee that
efficiency will be achieved only by bilateral trading (see Milgrom,
2004).
It is important to stress that a centralized marked for slots
with many buyers and many sellers would not be equivalent to
an auction with a unique seller (e.g. the regulator) of the kind
described in the previous section. In fact, with many buyers
and many sellers, and complementarities the core may be
empty. The core is the set of allocations of slots and money
with the property that no coalition can do better by trading on
its own. This means that no matter what centralized trading
mechanism a designer might propose, if the participants have
enough information, there is always some coalition among
them that can do better by refusing to cooperate in favour of
negotiating on their own. Let’s see this point with the following
example in Table 5.
Let’s assume that slot A and B belong to two different sellers
who are willing to sell them for any price above zero. Suppose
that First gets both A and B and pays strictly less than x + d. Then,
one of the two sellers must get less than x and therefore would
be willing to sell his slot to Second. Suppose, instead that Second
gets A from one seller for a price less than x. Then First would
offer x to the same seller and a price less than d to the other seller
in order to secure both slots.
Even if a secondary market alone cannot produce an efficient
outcome, a liquid European slot market would contribute towards
a more efficient allocation of slots. In fact, notwithstanding informat-
ional asymmetries and emptiness of the core, slot trading in United
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States and United Kingdom has been beneficial in many respects.
MottMcDonald (2006), a report prepared for the European
Commission, suggests that slot trading has been effective both in
fostering competition, and in facilitating new entry and increase
airplanes’ sizes. In particular, slot trading generally results in the
substitution of short-haul services operated by small aircrafts with
long haul services, operated by larger aircrafts.14
4. - Welfare Distribution
Assuming that the market mechanisms studied in the previous
section (congestion pricing, auctions and secondary trading) are
able to implement a more efficient allocation of slots to airlines,
this section analyses their implications in terms of the distribution
of the welfare.
According to the definition given in section 2, the value of the
slot is the highest value that someone would be prepared to pay
for it. Therefore, if slots are inefficiently allocated, part of their
value is dissipated. Meanwhile, the existing value is appropriated
by airlines who operate on the basis of the historical precedence
scheme.
If secondary trading was permitted at European airports
without operating any initial redistribution of slots, incumbent
airlines would benefit from the possibility of placing slots within
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TABLE 5
VALUES
A B AB
First 0 0 x+d
Second x x x
Note: x > d > 0.
14 UK data suggest that the average aircraft size increased some 81% from 139
to 250 seat per traded slot (see MOTT-MCDONALD, 2006, vol. I, 5.2.2.II).
their liquid assets or selling them to the best offerer. Therefore,
incumbents will appropriate most of the available efficiency gains
by selling those slots that generate profits which are lower than
what other carriers are prepared to pay for. As a result, the entire
value of slots would be allocated to incumbent airlines. To
understand the value of slots under the current grandfathering
rules, it is useful to look at the recent UK experience with
monetary trading. Rose (2003) suggests that British Airways
acquired four series of daily slots for about 16 million GBP, while
Virgin Atlantic acquired two series of daily slots for about 13
million GBP.
One way to reduce the economic rents to incumbency would
be to place a one-shot lump-sum tax on every slot before allowing
secondary trading to take place. For each slot, the carrier who
holds it according to the current grandfathering rules would
decide either to keep it and pay the tax or return it without paying
the tax. Returned slots could be reallocated through an auction.
The tax should be modulated according to the expected value of
each slot, in order to leave to incumbents only a certain fraction
of the total surplus. The tax, being one-shot and lump-sum, will
not affect incentives to efficient trade. In fact, efficiency will be
attained despite the level of the tax: even if a carrier decides to
keep the slot and pay the tax, he is still willing to sell the slot to
any carrier who can profit from it more than he does.
For example, suppose that First holds slot A and vF (A) = x
while vS (A) = y. Suppose that First is required to pay a tax t if he
decides to keep the slot, while otherwise the slot is put for sale
with an English auction.15 Clearly, First will return the slot if and
only if t > max {x, y}. In this case the slot will be subsequently
reallocated in the auction: to First at a price equal to y if x > y;
or to Second at a price of x if y > x. The regulator collects all
proceedings but the more efficient carrier still enjoys part of the
scarcity rents. First will keep the slot if t ≤ max {x, y}, but he will sell
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15 In an English auction, the auctioneer takes larger and larger bids from the
customers until non one increases his bid. In equilibrium, the bidder with the
highest valuation for the object wins and pays approximately the second highest
valuation for the object.
it thereafter to Second if y > x, at the price of y. In the latter case,
First will make a profit equal to y – t. Note that when t = y – x First
is neither worse off nor better off, when the situation is compared
to the case where grandfathering applies but no secondary trading
is allowed.
Alternatively, if slots were subtracted to their current
holders and allocated through an auction, incumbent airlines
would have to pay for a resource that they were previously
entitled to use for free. In fact, referring to the previous
example, the outcome would be the same as in the case where
t > max {x, y}. Therefore, according to equilibrium behaviour in
a English auction, if y > x First will suffer a net loss of x, the
regulator will collect x and Second will gain y – x, by obtaining
the slot and paying y. If, instead, x – y, then First would keep
the slot but would suffer a loss of y, which is the payment
collected by the regulator. 
Even if slots must be subtracted from incumbents, it would
still be possible to design auction rules that redistribute part of
the expected earnings on the basis of the initial slot holding of
the companies involved in the auction. This is possible without
upsetting incentives if the regulator is risk neutral and has
sufficient information on the expected revenue that will be
generated by the auction.16
Finally, increasing airport charges up to market clearing prices
would have the same distributional effect as an auction. In fact,
roughly speaking, market prices would reach levels such that only
those bidders who would obtain slots in a simultaneous ascending
auction would be prepared to pay. A relevant difference between
congestion pricing and the auction mechanism is the timing of
payments. While airport charges are paid every time the slot is
used, an auction would assign the property of the slot for a much
longer period of time.
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16 In order for incentives to operate properly, the sum which is distributed
must be independent of the outcome of the auction and calculated in order to
guarantee that auction proceedings will be sufficient in expectation to recover its
value. This is the same logic behind the properties of the expected externality
mechanism suggested by D’ASPREMONT C. - GERARD VARET L.A. (1979).
5. - Conclusions and a Way Forward
The two previous sections can be briefly summarized as
follows. A secondary market alone would not be able to produce
an efficient allocation of slots to airlines. In fact, informational
asymmetries and dispersed ownership of slots may prevent
efficient trading to take place, even when a centralized market is
in place. Furthermore, unless a tax is levied on slot holdings before
allowing any secondary trading, incumbents would fully
appropriate the value of slots, putting new entrants at a financial
disadvantage. Congestion pricing can help in mitigating excess
demand at peak hours but it is not a suitable instrument to solve
the efficiency problem. It simply doesn’t work well for our
purposes, neither in theory nor in practice. In particular, it is
highly implausible that regulators will have the necessary
information to set market clearing prices for slots. An auction
seems the most appropriate tool to implement an efficient
allocation of slots to airlines, but a careful combinatorial design
is needed to deal with complementarities. Moreover, the
subtraction of slots from incumbents may be highly disruptive for
the transport market, even though incumbents may be partially
compensated for the loss if the revenue of the auction is used to
their benefit.
Building on the previous analysis and trying to conciliate the
interests of incumbents and new entrants, I conclude the paper
with a draft proposal on how to allocate slots more efficiently at
European airports. In brief: all slots should be re-allocated
periodically through a combinatorial auction; some time before
the first auction takes place, and thereafter, secondary trading
should be allowed; proceedings from the auction should be
collected by the regulator and partly employed to reduce airlines’
costs.
We have discussed in length that a combinatorial auction, for
example the clock-proxy format, would be a good solution to the
problem of running a large sale of airport slots. Slots at major
European congested airports should be allocated simultaneously
in order to deal with complementarities across airports.
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Auctions should take place periodically and the exact number
of years between each auction should be determined with further
research. For instance, if slots were reallocated in each season,
airlines would have to revise their network structure frequently
and the volatility of their costs would increase, bringing an
increase in the cost of capital. Conversely, it would not be wise to
auction slots only once and for all, leaving the duty to the
secondary market to correct for changes in valuations of slots.
First, if slots were allocated indefinitely, their market price would
jump to very high levels because the value would discount an
indefinite use of the slot. Therefore, enormous financial resources
would be necessary to operate in the air transport market: while
all incumbents would risk bankruptcy in the effort to acquire slots,
small airlines may fall short of budget to obtain any interesting
slots. Second, as we have seen, a secondary market alone is not
the most appropriate instrument to achieve an efficient allocation. 
Of course, secondary trading should be authorized thoroughly
to allow airlines to revise their position and sell slots acquired by
mistake or that become useless at some point in time before a
new auction takes place.
The key point of the design consists in running the first
auction only after secondary trading has been authorized. This
would allow incumbents rationalize their network structure by
selling those slots which are inefficiently allocated to them. The
exact number of years between the introduction of secondary
trading and the first auction should be determined with further
research in order to guarantee to incumbent airlines a fair
compensation for the subsequent withdrawal of slots.
Proceedings from the auction should be collected by the
regulator and used to offset existing airport charges for the entire
period before the next auction takes place. Moreover, it would be
advisable to subsidize off-peak flights, in order to reduce demand
for peak slots. In the short-run, both measures would partially
compensate airlines for the payments they make in the auction.
The remaining revenue could be used to finance the development
of new airport capacity, thus reducing in the long-run the prices
of slots. 
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In this paper we carefully avoided the discussion of compet-
ition policy issues. However, two points deserve major attention
before concluding. First, antitrust scrutiny would be needed to
avoid the exploitation of market power by incumbent airlines, both
during the operation of secondary trading and at the auction.
Second, compatibly with state aid rules, it may be useful to reserve
slots in the auction to encourage entry in particular routes or to
guarantee specific public service obligations.
At first glance the proposal above seems to me a viable
compromise. However, competition policy issues and many of the
complex technicalities of the air transport market have been
ignored. Further research is needed, keeping in mind that in
market design, evil is in the details.
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